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Venkat lyer" Courts and Constitutional Usurpers:
Some Lessons from Fiji
Much concern and disappointment has been expressed by jurists and human
rights campaigners over the inaction of national judiciaries in reversing the effects
of coups d'etat and other acts which result in the unconstitutional overthrow of
democratically constituted governments Against this backdrop, the decisive
steps taken b) the superior courts of Flj to nullify the attempted destabilisation of
that country's elected government in Alay, 2000 was a trail-blazing development
The author analyses the jurisprudence in this area and explains the implications
of the Fijian judgments.
Les junstes et les defenseurs des droits de la personne ont clam6 haut et fort leurs
inquietudes et leur deception face a I inaction des corps ludiciaires nationaux
pour annuler les effets de coups d'etat et d'autres actes qui ont pour r6sultat
de renverser des gouvernements constitues democratiquement. Sur cette toile
de fond, les mesures energiques prises par les tribunau.x suprieurs des ies
Fidji pour annuler la tentative de destab,sation du gouvernement elu de ce pays
en mai 2000 se d~marquent comme mesures tout 6 fait d'avant-garde L'auteur
analyse la jurisprudence dans ce domaine et explique les incidences des
decisions des tribunaux fidliens.
* BSc, LLB, LLM. PhD, Barrister-at-Law, Senior Lecturer in Law and Research Fellow,
Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster at Jordanstown, UK. The author is indebted to
Professor Colin Warbrick of the Uni'.ersity of Durham and Professor Colim Campbell of the University
of Ulster for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.
28 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Inltroduction
I. Judicial dilemmas in coups d'tat
II. Judicial responses: defensive activism
!. Legal realities: The doctrine ofnece.vsitV
2. The cflctiveness of a regime change
Ill. Factual Background of the Fijian coup d 'tat
IV. The Prasad trial
V. The appellate proceedings
VI. State necessiti in Prasad
VII. Effectiveness of the regime change in Prasad
VIII. Human rights: considerations in Prasad
IX. The Prasadjudgments evaluated
X. The aftermath of Prasad
Conclusion: Prasad and ftture usurpations of power
Introduction
The impotence of national courts in the face of unconstitutional
overthrows of governments' has been the subject of long running debate,
especially in the Commonwealth. This association of independent states
- the largest in the w orld after the United Nations - has witnessed more
than its fair share of coups d'Mt in recent years' and has, from time to
time, been the focus of international concern on matters of human rights
and the rule of la\N. Given that the Commonwealth accounts for over a
quarter of the w\orld's population, encompasses all major religious, ethnic
and language groups and is spread over a large number of geographic
regions, the high incidence of military and other unconstitutional regimes
among its member states does indeed raise troubling questions.
Initiati-ves to tackle this problem on a pan-Commonwealth basis
have, historically, been thin on the ground. The early 1990s did, however,
signal a turning point, with the adoption by the Commonwealth Heads
I Not all instances of usurpation of state po\Ner are unlawful, or esen illegitimate. There are,
clearly, situations where an extra-legal change of government would be justified: eg. where the
change is aimed at toppling an oppressive regime which is so deeply and firmly entrenched in power
that an, means of democratic change is, for all practical purposes, impossible. An example under this
c alcgi,r. %kould he the go\ernment headed by President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, which
\N as toppled hy a "people ptm or" re\ olution in I8,
2. Acording to a recent stud'y, one-third of all Commonwealth countries have experienced at
least one unconstitutional overthrow of government dunng the past 30 years, see John Hatchard and
Tunde I. O ,go\ two. Tackhng the U nconstitutional Overthrow of Democracies: Emerging Trends in the
(nommoowealth (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 20131 at 7.
Courts and Constitutional Usurpers
of Government of the 'Harare Declaration' 3 which, among other things,
stressed -democracy. democratic processes and institutions..., the rule
of law and independence of the judiciary, just and honest government
[and] human rights" as fundamental principles binding on all member
states.4 Since then, there have been some efforts to isolate and condemn
crnovements that have come to power through unconstitutional means,5
but the efficacy of those efforts remains highly contentious. There has also
been a good deal of ambivalence on the part of courts within Commonwealth
countries towyards the issue of coups d'tat as the jurisprudence from
countries such as Pakistan, noted below, indicate.
For all the oft-repeated judicial rhetoric about the sanctity of
representative government and the rule of laN , by and large, the traditional
response of the courts has been to acquiesce in usurpations of power,
usually with recourse to the Kelsenian doctrine of revolutionary legality.6
Although the reasons for such acquiescence are not far to seek - they
are, plainly, rooted in the compulsions of realpolitik - the practice has
engendered a high degree of scepticism about the ability of courts to act as
a bulwark against the subversion of duly constituted governments.
Against this rather gloomy background, the approach adopted by
the superior courts of Fiji in their response to the legal challenges to the
overthrow, in May 2000, of that country's elected government must be
seen as blazing a newv and refreshing trail.7 These courts ruled, in effect,
that the military government which had assumed office following the coup
lacked legal legitimacy and that the democratic Constitution which that
government had purported to abrogate remained in force. The judgments
have been hailed as "an important landmark in the history of the common
3. The Harare Common~kealth Declaration, issued b\ Heads of Government of the Commonv\ calth
(21 October 1991), art. 9, online: Commonwealth Secretariat <http:/i/Nw. thecommonwealth.org/
Templates/Intemal.a.p'?N ode] D=35773>.
4. Ibid at para. 6.
5. For example, the suspensions of Pakistan, Fiji and Zimbabwe from membership of the
Commonwealth in 1999, 2000 and 2002, respectively.
6. See e.g. The State : Dosso, [1958] 1 P.L.D. 533. Madimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1968] (2)
S.A. 284.
7. The two main cases are: Prasad r Republic of Fijt & Anor, (2001] N.Z.A.R. 21 (judgment of
the High Court of Lautoka dated 15 No'. 2000); Republic of Fiji & Anor %. Prasad, [2001] N.Z.A.R.
385 (judgment of the Fiji Court of Appeal, delivered on I Mar. 2001). In addition, important issues
of a similar nature were raised, and answered, in at least two other cases: Jokapeci Koroi and Ors v
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue and .4ttorne,-General and Republic of Fiji, [2003] N.Z.A.R.
18 [Jokapeci] (judgment of the High Court of Fiji dated 24 Aug. 2001, which turned on the validity
of a decree issued by the usurper government contrary to the provisions of the pre-coup Constitution)
and Jokapeci Koroi and Ors. v. Asesela Ravmu & Ors. (unreported judgment dated 24 Aug. 2001, in
which the High Court ruled that the caretaker government had no power to appoint a Commission to
reconsider the Constitution of Fiji).
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law,"' heralding as they do a move away from the hitherto passive
acceptance by the courts of the legality of usurper regimes which had
made themselves effective. In a broader context, they may also be seen as
a contribution to the ongoing global efforts to make the right to democratic
governance an intrinsic component of international human rights law."
More significantly, the Fijian developments represent a rare example of the
courts actually succeeding, however imperfectly, in thwarting the designs
of a usurper regime and restoring, in substantial measure, the sanctity of
the pre-coup legal order. Viewed through the prism of the ongoing process
of transition - from conflict to peace and democracy - the Prasad and
related judgments represent a significant contribution by the judiciary to
"the reversal of the delegitimation of domestic law and of legal institutions
that occurred during the conflict.""'
The judgments are, therefore, clearly as welcome as they are
important, not least for the relativelN strong symbolic message they send
out in an area of the laN which has all too often been characterised by
fudges, compromises and messy rationalisations." But do they provide a
reliable and principled legal basis for dealing with future cases involving
the unconstitutional overthrow of governments'? Are they as revolutionary
in terms of their practical potential impact as has been claimed by some
of the commentators? To a large extent, they do and they are, however,
before an attempt is made tojustiv these opinions by analysing the effects
of the judgments, it would be useful to look at the conceptual issues
which underpin judicial approaches in this rather murky area of law and
politics.
1. Judicial dile',mmax in coups d'Ltat
That judiciaries are usually called upon to play an important, often crucial,
role in the immediate aftermath of an unconstitutional usurpation of power
is undeniable. Equally undeniable is the fact that both judges, as individuals,
and the judiciary, as an institution, are subjected by such events to severe
1 Georec \k iliam,, "The Casc That Stopped a Coup? The Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in
Fiji" (2002) I Oxford U. Cmwlth. L. J. 73.
. The emergence of such a right has been can% a"scd b\ a number of commentators in recent years;
scc, eg Thomas %1, Franck. 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 A.J.I.L.
4', Christina M. Cerna, "Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or a Pipe Dream of the
Wcs'i"" 995) 27 N.Y.U.J. Int.'l. & Pol. 281), Richard Burchill, "'The Developing International Law of
Democracy'" (201) 04 Mod. L. R. 123.
I It Christine Bell, (. olin Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, "Justice [)i',courses in Transition" (2004)
13:3 Social and Lcegal Studic' 305 at 312.
II. In lme'ss to the judges, it needs to be conceded that "[t]he legal and moral issues involved in
coups and re\ olutions arc complex," as one leading academic expert in this area recently reminded us:
sc I M. Brooklicld, Revie\k ol "TcA-In. Mec Uncontitutional Overthrow of Democracies [2004] P.L.
657 at 6X8.
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pressures which demand of them a high degree of personal and institutional
strength. Gi\ en that the judicial branch of government possesses the power
of neither the purse nor the sw\ord, and given that judges, like other human
beings, are usually loath to jeopardise their careers and their privileges
in what may turn out to be a prolonged, and unwinnable, tussle with the
usurpers and the considerable powers at their disposal, what often ensues
is a Faustian bargain between the judges and the new rulers. This bargain
usually involves the judges upholding the validity of the usurper regime
albeit with some conditions attached, -2 and the usurpers agreeing to allow
the judges undisturbed enjoyment of their positions and privileges. But it
must be noted that this bargain is not always the result of pure self-interest
on the part of the judges: occasionally. it is motivated by a genuine desire
on their part to stave off greater damage to the judiciary as a whole.1
Where the bargain was induced solely by blandishments offered by the
usurpers, it has, rightly, been seen as little short of judicial corruption. As
the authors of a recent study on the subject noted, l[whilst it is certainly
true that a successfully executed coup presents the political system with
a fait accompli and it would therefore be unrealistic to expect every
segment of society not to "collaborate" through passivity, in the case of
judges that enter into this implicit bargain their collaboration is active, not
passive, and their validating actions contribute in no small measure to the
legitimisation of coups.""4
There are, indeed, situations \- here the pressures on the judiciary may
be far from overwhelming, and where the judges may enjoy some room for
manoeuvre vis-u-vis the usurpers and their actions. In such circumstances,
leaving aside considerations of personal courage, are there any principles
or policy considerations which should require the judges to act in one
way rather than another? Adherents of liberalism have argued that the
judges have a duty to save, rather than acquiesce in the destruction of,
the constitutional order whose operation is disrupted by the actions of the
usurpers. This proposition is grounded partly on notions of democratic
ideals - what one writer has called "the internal morality of democracy"'15
- and partly on grounds of constitutional foundationalism, i.e. the need to
respect the sanctity of constitutions and settled constitutional orders which
have been duly established. A constitution is, after all, nothing short of
12. Such as a requirement that the usurpers will seek a democratic mandate from the people within
a stipulated time.
13. Such as a real possibility of the usurpers emasculating the judiciary altogether, for example by
replacing the ordinary courts with military tribunals.
14. John Hatchard & Tunde i. Ogowewo, Tackling the Unconstitutional Overthrow of Democracies,
supra note 2 at 17.
15. Cass R. Sunstein, "Questioning Constitutional Justice" (1997) 6:1 E. Eur Const. Rev. 61 at 63.
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"an enduring but evolving statement of general values"' 6 which needs to
be afforded the strongest protection from dissipation under pressure.
The defence of human rights also provides an important rationale for
judicial activism in this context. In recent years courts at both international
and domestic levels have put increasing emphasis on the paramount need
for human rights considerations to be taken into account while judging the
actions of governments, including emergency regimes.1 7 Unfortunately, the
Fijian judges, for all their courage, appear to have showed an insufficient
appreciation of this aspect of the matter, which is far from satisfactory, as
will be explained below.
In addition, the role of law in communities in transition may also be
significant. In \\hat is often referred to as "paradigmatic" transition, i.e.
transition from violent conflict to peace and democracy, law can play
a mediating and moderating role, given its inherent characteristics of
neutrality and legitimacy. As Bell, Campbell and Ni Aolain have pointed
out, this is particularly true of international law w hich can, among other
things, "buttress the autonomy of key legal norms such as the right to life,
so as to affect how the state ... can conduct the conflict."' 9 Similarly,
domestic law, when enforced b\ a robust and independent judiciary, can
perfbrm an equally beneficial role, as the e\ ents in Fiji have demonstrated.
Indeed, it is often the case, especiall\ in conflict situations where political
control is exercised by a regime that is either hostile to, or dismissive
of, measures of external scrutiny, the only remaining avenue of possible
redress is domestic la\\ and intervention b\ the domestic courts. The
Fijian experience, it is submitted, otTers a valuable object lesson in such
transitional discourse.
I1. Judicial re.,onses: dt lens ive activism
The central issue in any coup related litigation turns on the justification for
hat may be called "defensive judicial activism", that is to say, judicial
activism \\ hich is aimed at defending - i.e. saving, preserving or reclaiming
- the constitutional order and the constitutional values which are at risk of
extinction by the usurpers. The justification begs such questions as: (i) to
what extent can judges insist on being the custodians of the constitutional
order under which they were appointed?; and (ii) how legitimate would
be their claims to go behind (or to ignore) any new constitutional or
16 l)Dnald R Wright, "The Role of the Judiciary From vlarbury to Anderson" (1972) 60 Cal. L.
Rev, 1262 at 120,
17. S.cc, eg, the observations of Haynes P. in 1 bchell & Others : Director of Public Prosecutions
& 4nother, I 9M6]X L.R.C. (Cont.) 35 [ 1achell].
Ix. Svc Bell, ct~al.. mi;w note 10 at 31)
19, iid at 311
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other dispensation that the usurpers may have established or may seek to
establish'? The defence of democracy, it is submitted, provides a strong
rationale for judicial activism in such circumstances.
This rationale has been recognised by a number of writers,' and it has
also received a measure of judicial approval over the years. Before those
views are examined, it may be useful to make a few general observations
on the nature of the judicial function. It is now widely accepted that judges
are, by virtue of both their training and the nature of the office they occupy,
eminently suited to act as custodians of constitutional values in societies
governed by the rule of law. They are unlikely to be swayed by the
prevailing political winds in the - ay that other actors in a democracy often
are, and they are therefore more able to take a detached and dispassionate
view of the relative merits of the highly charged arguments which dominate
competitive politics. Little wonder that the notion of constitutionalism
and judicial review has become a dominant characteristic of post-Nvar
polities, especially in societies governed by written constitutions and bills
of rights. -'
Quite clearly, judicial review is not without its dangers. If used
indiscriminately or irresponsibly. it runs the risk of substituting judicial
dictatorship for democratic decision making. However, the use of judicial
review in defence of democracy and the rule of law is entirely justifiable.
The legal philosopher John Hart Ely has argued, for example, that judges
should aggressively review laNN s and actions for their compliance with such
pre-conditions for the operation of democracy as: (a) the rule of law; (b)
formal access to democratic processes; and (c) adequate representation. -22
In his opinion, judicial review is justified .vhen there is a "[systemic]
malfunctioning"" of what he calls the "political market". Although Ely's
observations were made in the context of a "normal" society, its relevance
to societies where the "'political market" has been disrupted by a coup d 'tat
or other revolutionary action can hardly be denied; if anything, defensive
judicial review assumes an even greater justification and urgency in the
latter situation.
20. See e.g. John Hart Ely, Democraci and Distrust. - Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge:
Harvard Uniersity Press, 1980).
21. See e.g. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracv: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), at 1-2. Hirschl, incidentally, is rather
sceptical of the benefits of this phenomenon. A fervent advocate of constitutionalisation and judicial
review, on the other hand, is Ronald Dworkin w.hose enthusiasm for these concepts owes much to his
abhorrence of the tyranny of majority rule in democracies governed by parliamentary sovereignty, see
e.g. Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990).
22. John Hart Ely, Democrao, and Distrust. supra note 20.
23. Ibid. at 103.
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No objection can be advanced against such activism on the grounds
that the judges are, by ordering a return to the pre-coup constitutional
order, engaging in any form of "value determination", because the only
value (if it can be so called) which they are expressing is the pre-eminence
of the Constitution - a value whose importance to democracy and the rule
of law is unquestionable. Nor can the court be said to be performing a
policy function of the kind that constitutional courts are often criticised
for attempting to perform, in the sense of taking positions on controversial
questions ofnational policy. 4 At best, defensivejudicial review involves the
judges in protecting -rights that are in some sense basic or fundamental,"'2
which is a function that is entirely consistent with the criterion of right or
justice often used in appraising the role of a constitutional court.26
Defensive judicial activism can be justified on another benevolent
principle, viz. the need for the stakes of political battles to be kept as
lo\\ as possible in the interests of the well-being of a democracy. This
principle owes its origin to the political scientist Adam Przeworski, but it
has been developed and applied in relation to judicial review by William
Eskridge of the Yale LaN\ School, who has argued eloquently in favour
of "pluralism-facilitating" judicial review.' Eskridge's central thesis is
that:
judges should enforce [the rules of judicial rexiew], regardless of the
desirabilit. of the outcomes reached outside the prescribed process.
Because strict enforcement inmests the political process with greater
neutrality, it contributes to lower stakes.2"
The need to lower the stakes, Eskridge argues, is particularly
important in relation to political tussles involving -what Clifford Geertz
has called "primordial loyalties", 2 9 viz. a person's race, ethnicity, religion
or sexualit, because they are not usually susceptible to resolution through
calm deliberation. "Where the stakes of politics get high," says Eskridge,
"especially \\hen they involve primordial loyalties, warring groups are
more likely to engage in games of chicken, where the goal of each group
24. See .g. Robert A l)ahl, "l)cci, ion-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Polic\-Maker" ( 1957) 6 J. Pub. L. 279
25. Ibid at 29 1
26, Ibid at 2NI
27. In Proic',,,or I ,,kndgc'. \ic , judges can, among other things, encourage the N idest possible
participation in a democracN by as,,uring that the neutral rule,; of an open political system are
igi,'uu'N. cnlorced: see William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Plurali,m and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
r)cm.,LracN by Lowering the Stakes, of Politics'" (2015) 114 Yale L. 1279. online: Yale L.J. <www.
yalclawjournal org,ym pos, um/documents/Eskridge.pdt'.
2X, Iid at 123.
I Cliflbrd Gecrtz, "'he Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the
NcN Statc'" in ( iccrt". h2w Iriu'7'tehin The Ctdtures (NeN% York: Basic Books, 1973), 255 at 259.
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becomes imposing harm or status denigration on the other.""' Since clashcs
involving primordial lo alties lie at the root of many of the coups d'&tat,
including the Fijian one under discussion, the importance of defensive
judicial review cannot be ox erstated.
Yet it must also be asked, where a judge engages in defensive judicial
review of the kind being discussed, does he or she import a personal
conception of morality into the decision making process? Ronald Dworkin
has famously suggested that judges in constitutional cases cannot avoid
making moral value choices." His view\ has been attacked by a number of
writers on the grounds, intei- alia. that it wxould lead to a systematic bias
in judicial choice of fundamental values," and that it \xould make judicial
decisions no better than political ones. 3 This is certainly true of decisions
on socially or culturally divisixe issues such as abortion or homosexual
rights. But N\here a constitutional court decrees the reinstatement of a
legal order abrogated by a coup dicat. its decision stands on a different
footing. The judges do not make any moral choice about the law being
reinstated, viz. the duly established constitution, they merely reaffirm its
enduring nature.
Put another way. by expressing their preference for the continuation of
the basic values enshrined in the pre-coup constitution rather than for their
abrogation, the judges are performing the function of a "process-enforcing
referee""4 - a function that is entirely appropriate in a society governed by
the rule of law. Their action becomes all the more justifiable if regard is
had to the fact that the pre-coup constitution carries the imprimatur - as it
clearly did in the case of the 1997 Constitution of Fiji35 - of a democratic
mandate. Therefore, far from either usurping the functions of another body,
or acting outside their legitimate domain, the judges are simply acting as
neutral enforcers of the democratic wishes of the people.
Even conservatixe commentators have conceded that it is quite
consistent with thejudicial function forjudges to express a moral preference,
as long as that preference accords with that of the law-maker. In the words
of Robert Bork, '[iun a constitutional democracy, the moral content of the
law must be given by the morality of the framer or the legislator, never by
the morality of the judge. 36 When, therefore, a constitutional court rules
30. Eskridge, supra note 27 at 121.
31. See, e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously I London: Duckworth, 1978).
32. John Hart Ely, Democracyv and Distrust. supra note 20 at 58-59.
33. Ran Hirschl, Towards Jurislocracy; vipra note 21 at 188.
34. Eskridge, supra note 27.
35. This Constitution, as will be explained later, was established after a lengthy and extensive
process of public consultation, and was approved unanimously by the Fijian Parliament.
36. Robert Bork, Tradition and Moralin. in Con iittional Lmv (Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984 ) at 1I.
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- as the Fijian courts did - that the values and the provisions of the pre-
coup constitution prevail over any norms that are sought to be laid down
by the usurpers, that ruling is entirely sustainable.
In addition, when a court is called upon to review the validity of a
purported constitutional abrogation, it usually does so as a court which
owes its own existence to that very Constitution. It is entirely proper,
therefore, for the court to do everything within its power to defend and
protect the constitutional order under which it was created. This important
principle was explained with great clarity by Justice Fieldsend of the
Rhodesian Supreme Court in the landmark case of Madzimbamuto v.
Lardner-Burke:
It is not part of a court's legal function to repudiate the legal and
constitutional system under which it was appointed, or to involve itself
in the construction or justification of a new and different foundation for
its existence ...
A court created by a written Constitution can have no independent
existence apart from that Constitution; it does not receive its powers
from the common law and declare what its own powers are; it is not
a creature of Frankenstein which once created can turn and destroy its
maker. It is a matter of the supremacy of the Constitution...
A court cannot sit to decide under what system of government it is
exercising jurisdiction. It must accept its reason for existence as
stemming from the original Constitution as an unchallengeable fact."
That said, it would be unrealistic to ignore the very real practical
difficulties that judges of constitutional courts face in the aftermath of
revolutionary seizures of power, as noted at the beginning of this article.
The pressures of realpolitik have, therefore, led many judges to attempt to
steer a "middle" course between absolute heroism and total capitulation.
This they have usually done by offering the usurpers a degree of temporary
legitimacy in exchange for a promise of return to constitutional "'normality"
through, for example, the holding of fresh elections within a limited time.3
They have justified such action on the factual basis that there has been a
measure of popular acceptance of the new regime; all they are doing, they
claim, is putting their imprimatur on "a flood of changing consensus" in
society, to adopt the words of Mark Tushnet. 3' In legal terms, they have
resorted to the Kelsenian theory of revolutionary legality referred to earlier,
37. Supra note 6 at 429k
38. Such a tactic has not, of course. always produced the expected results, as the succession of
military coups in Pakistan have shown oN er the years.
39. %lark Tushnet, 'Darkness at the Edge of To%%n: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Contitutional Theory" (1980) 89 Yale L. J. 1037 at 1042.
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using the twin tests of -necessity" and "effectivcness" to justify - and to
some extent to moderate - the deviations from constitutional democracy.
It is these tests, therefore, that must now be examined.
1. Legal realities: The doctrine of/Pcessint
The concept of necessity has a respectable pedigree in law and legal
philosophy and can be traced back to ancient times. Bracton noted that
.'what is otherwise unlawful necessity makes lawful," 4 ' while Rousseau
was of the opinion that "the primary intention of the people is that the
state should not perish."' Even Thomas Jefferson, a staunch advocate of
limited government, agreed that:
The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saN ing our country when
in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous
adherence to written lawN, would be to lose the law itself, with life,
liberty, property and those who are enjoy ing them with us; thus absurdly
sacrificing the end to the means.' :
This doctrine finds expression in the emergency provisions of most
national constitutions, and has been invoked by governments time and
again.43 In recent years, much wyork has been undertaken at the international
level to moderate the use of emergency powers, and to ensure that the
concept of necessity is confined within strict and narrow limits.'
The need for judicial vigilance in dealing with pleas of necessity by
usurpers was underlined in a 1986 judgment of the Grenada Court of
Appeal, in which Haynes P. laid down a number of conditions for the
acceptance of the doctrine:
(i) an imperative necessit\ must arise because of the existence of
exceptional circumstances not provided for in the Constitution,
for immediate action to be taken to protect or preserve some vital
function of the State;
(ii) there must be no other course of action reasonably available;
(iii) any such action must be reasonably necessary in the interest of
peace, order. and good go- ernment: but it must not do more than is
necessary or legislate beyond that;
40. "Id quod ahas non est licitum, necessitas licitum facit" - cited in Glanville Williams, "The
Defence of Necessity" [ 1953] Curt. Legal Probs. 216 at 218.
41. Social Contract, IV, 6, quoted in Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis
Government in the Modern Democracies (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979) 12.
42. Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings o/ Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.B. Putnam's Sons,
1893) 279-80.
43. See e.g. States of Emergencv: Their Impact of Human Rights (Geneva: International Commission
of Jurists, 1983).
44. For a comprehensive survey of the initiatives undertaken in this area, see Venkat lyer, "States of
Emergency: Moderating their Effects on Human Rights" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 125-189.
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(i) it must not impair the just rights of citizens under the
Constitution,
(v) it must not be one the sole effect and intention of which is to
consolidate or strengthen the revolution as such."
In terms of the procedure to be followed in cases involving the use of
the doctrine, the learned judge added perceptively that:
It is for this court to pronounce on the validity (i fso) ofany unconstitutional
action on the basis of necessity, after determining as questions of fact,
whether or not the above conditions exist. But it is for the party requiring
the Court to do so to ensure that proof of this is on the record.
Such validation will not be a once-for-all validation, so to speak, it will
be a temporary one, being effective only during the existence of the
necessity. If and when this ends, the right constitutional steps must be
taken forthwith, that is, within a reasonable time. "
This judicial warning '\as necessary given the alacrity with which
some courts in the Commonwealth have previously validated usurpations
of power by military and political adventurers, often under circumstances
which smacked of pure opportunism and expediency. An oft cited
example of such haste can be found in the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Pakistan in State : Dosso.4 which \ as condemned by one writer as "a
cuatc blanche for treasonable conduct."' There, the court was faced with
a challenge to the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order promulgated by the
President of Pakistan after he had abrogated the Constitution, dissolved
Parliament and declared martial law on the eve of a general election which
threatened the ouster from power of his favoured section of the political
elite. The Order provided that all the laws that were on the statute book
prior to the abrogation of the Constitution would continue in force, subject
to the important qualification that the martial law administrator would have
unfettered legislative powers. The Supreme Court, headed by Muhammad
Munir C.J., laid down a remarkably lenient test to judge the legality of the
President's actions:
It sometimes happens ... that a Constitution and the national legal
order under it is disrupted by an abrupt political change not within the
contemplation of the Constitution. Any such change is called a revolution,
and its legal effect is not only the destruction of the existing Constitution,
but also the \alidity of the national legal order. A revolution is generally
45 Ulchell, mlqpr note 17 at 8N.
4h Ibid
47. [1958 I P.L.D. 533 (S. ( t.) ID,,so].
4K Iarooq I lavan, "A Juridical Critique of Successful Treason: A Jurisprudential Analysis of the
Consttutionality ofa Coup d'Etat in the Common Law" (1484) 20 Stan. J. Int'l. L. 191 at 217.
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associated w ith public tumult, mutiny. violence and bloodshed but from
a juristic point of view the method b% %% hich and the persons by whom
a revolution is brought about is wholly immaterial. The change may
be attended b\ %iolence or it ma\ be perfectly peaceful. It may take
the form of a coup d'etat by a political adventurer or it ma\ be effected
by persons already in public positions. Equally irrelevant in law is the
moti\ e for a re\ olution. inasmuch as a destruction of the constitutional
structure may be prompted by a highly patriotic impulse or by the most
sordid of ends. For the purposes of the doctrine here explained a change
is, in law, a revolution if it annuls the Constitution and the annulment
is effective. If the attempt to break the Constitution fails, those who
sponsor or organise it are judged b\ the existing Constitution to be guilty
of the crime of treason. But if the revolution is victorious in the sense
that the persons assuming power under the change can successfully
require the inhabitants of the countr\ to conform to the new regime, then
the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact because thereafter its
own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled Constitution but
by reference to its own success..
After a change of the character I ha\ e mentioned has taken place, the
national legal order must for its validity depend upon the new law-
creating organ. Even the Courts lose their existing jurisdictions, and
can function only to the extent and in the manner determined by the new
Constitution."
This test, which was justified on the basis of what one analyst has
called "a facile resort"" to the theory of revolutionary legality propounded
by the Austrian philosopher Hans Kelsen,2 paid no regard whatsoever to
the question whether the actions of the usurper w\ere necessary at all in the
sense that there was a real and imminent threat to the existence of the state
or to the government established by law. Such was the tenuous nature of
the usurper President's hold on power, incidentally, that within days of the
Dosso judgment being handed down. he was himself toppled by a senior
army officer! 2
Unsurprisingly, the attraction of the Dosso test was not lost on courts
in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, some of which embraced it with
enthusiasm when faced with the dilemma of having to rule on the legality
49. Dosso, supra note 47 at 538-539.
50. Cyrus V. Das, Governments and Crisis Powers (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Current Law Journal
Sdn. Bhd., 1996) at 34.
51. See Hans Kelsen, General Theor
" 
of Law and State (Nc" York: Russell & Russell, 1945).
52. By contrast, the Fiji judges in Prasad v Republic of Fiji, supra note 7 at 4546, were more
robust in their approach to assessing the claims of necessity put forward by the post-coup go emnment,
insisting that it adduce evidence of a high order to make its case, as discussed later in greater detail. This
is another important distinguishing characteristic of the Prasadjudgments, which can be appreciated
without imposing a duty of heroism of judges.
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of usurper regimes, 3 But it was not without its critics, including some on
the Bench. The Supreme Court of Pakistan itself stepped back from Dosso
in 1972 when, faced with a challenge to the legality of the administration
set up by another usurper, General Yahya Khan, it paid greater attention to
the need to use the 'necessity' yardstick. -It was by no means [Kelsen's]
purpose," said the Chief Justice, Hamoodur Rahman, in Jilani v. State of
Punjab "that every person who was successful in grabbing power could
claim to have become also a law-creating agency. '"'54
No less importantly, the court in that case laid down certain
qualifications for the recognition of usurper regimes:
The doctrine can be invoked in aid only after the Court has come to
the conclusion that the acts of the usurpers [sic] were illegal and
illegitimate. It is only then that the question arises as to how many of
his acts, legislative or otherwkise, should be condoned or maintained,
notwithstanding their illegality, in the wider public interest. I would
call this a principle of condonation and not legitimisation. Applying
this test I would condone: (I ) all transactions which are past and closed,
for no useful purpose can be served by reopening them; (2) all acts and
legislative measure[s] which are in accordance with, or could have been
made under, the abrogated Constitution or the previous legal order; (3)
all acts %%hich tend to advance or promote the good of the people; (4) all
acts required to be done for the ordinary orderly running of the State. I
would not, however, condone any act intended to entrench the usurper
more firmly in his power or to directly help him to run the country
contrary, to its legitimate objectives. I would not also condone anything
which seriously impairs the rights of the citizens except in so far as they
be designed to advance the social welfare and national solidarity."
The Chief Justice's reference to the "previous legal order" is rather
confusing because it suggests, contrary to all other assertions which are
predicated on the basis that the usurper's actions are being judged by the
touchstone of the pre-coup order, that the court has recognised a new legal
order,
For all the judicial rhetoric articulated in Jilani, the phenomenon of
military take-overs has continued unabated in Pakistan. In May 2000, the
Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the doctrine of necessity following
the coup mounted by Gen. Pervez Musharraf some seven months earlier.
On this occasion the Court again proclaimed a desire to hold the line
53. Sic c g Uganda r Commi.wsioner of Priion%. f.kr parte %fatov, 11966] E.A. 514 (Uganda); R.
v Ndhlovu [I 96Xj 4 S.A.L.R. 515 (Rhodesia). Federation i: Guardian Newspapers Ltd., [1999] 9
N.W.L.R. 187 (Nigeria). See also Afad.zmbamuto r Lardner-Burke, [1968] 3 All E.R. 561 (P.C.),
%k here Lord Reid referred to the Kelsenian theorN, albeit cursorily.
54. .4smaJilani v State ,/ Punjab, P.LD. 1972 S.C. l3k4at 180.
55. Ibid at 207.
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laid down in Jilani by confining the doctrine of necessity within narrow
limits, but it simultaneously offered the usurper considerable room for
manoeuvre by allowing him to rule extra-constitutionally for three years."
It ruled that the coup could be justified on the basis of the maxim salus
populi suprema lex,5' because "the Constitution offered no solution to the
present crisis [of rampant corruption, maladministration and economic
mismanagement].""9 For good measure, it took judicial notice "of the fact
that the people of Pakistan have generally welcomed the army take-over,"
and accepted the military government's assurance that it intended to return
the country to constitutional rule within three years.
In putting its imprimatur on this "constitutional deviation", the
judges did lay down a number of conditions, including that the military
government would not carry out any amendments to the existing, i.e. pre-
coup, Constitution that would have the effect of obliterating its "salient
features"; 59 that it shall respect the fundamental rights of the people in
accordance with the provisions of that Constitution; and that it shall only
carry out acts which "tend to ad% ance or promote the good of the people"
and are "required for the ordinar orderly running of the State. "' ° The
Court also made it clear that its power of judicial review granted by the
Constitution would continue unaltered "notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained in any legislative instrument enacted by [Gen.
Musharrafj and/or any order issued by [him] or by any person or authority
acting on his behalf."','
This judgment clearly represented a delicate balancing act on the
part of the Court. In the words of one academic commentator, the judges
offered the military rulers "a political bargain": legal legitimacy in return
for a promise of resumption of democracy within three years. 2 But the
bargain was not without some serious long-term consequences:
56. The court characterised the actions of General Musharraf as "extra-constitutional" rather
than "unconstitutional". "This is not." observed the court, "a case where old legal order has been
completely suppressed or destroyed, but mereli a case of constitutional deviation for a transitional
period so as to enable the Chief ExecutiN e [i.e. Gen. \lusharrafl to achieved his declared objectives."
- Judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Constitutional Petitions No. 62/99, 63/99, 53199,
57/99, 3/2000, 66/99 and 64'9Q. accessible online: <,ww.lawfirm.org.pk/Military-Reviewhtm> (1
September 2004).
57. "The welfare of the people is the supreme la."
58. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan (12 May 2000), supra note 56. The Court accepted
material in the form of "newspaper clippings, writings, etc." tendered by the new administration as
evidence of the "crisis" which justified the coup.
59. Ibid. The Court listed the following as salient features: "independence of the judiciary, federalism,
parliamentary form of government blended with Islamic provisions."
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. N.W. Barber, "The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan" (2000) 116 Law Q. Rev. 569 at
572.
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There is a cost ... to ackno-wledging the principle of state necessity as a
feature of Pakistani constitutional law. It effectively raises the Army to
an institution of government; it acknowledges that the military has a role
to play as part of the checks and balances of the Pakistani system. The
long-term costs of this is considerable.
Once democratic government is resumed there will always be the fear that,
at times of strain, the military -x ill decide to intervene. A consequence of
the existence of state necessit. is that in some circumstances the Army
will be legally entitled, or permitted to act. There is a risk that this may
serve to encourage military rule.6"
With the benefit of hindsight, the Court NN as probably a bit optimistic
about the prospects of a full return to democratic rule within three years.
In April 2002, in a tactic which provoked significant domestic and
international criticism," General M usharraf ordered a referendum, 65 rather
than full-fledged general elections that most people expected to legitimise
his rule for a further period of fie Nears. The referendum proposal was
approx ed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan"" and it resulted in the General
being confirmed in his office by a large majority.
2. The c//-ctivtxcss o/ a regime change
The question of effectiveness is one of the most controversial aspects of
the jurisprudence on usurper regimes and is intimately connected with
the principle of necessity. so it Nrill be useful to survey that jurisprudence
belore turning attention to the Fijian approach to the subject. Courts are, it
must be noted at the outset, not particularly well-suited to embark upon in-
depth assessments either of the stability or the popularity of governments.
This limitation has not, however, prevented them from undertaking such
assessments, usually in the context of post-coup litigation, with the result
that a considerable body of contentious case law has developed over the
years.
In Nigeria, for example, the courts have showxn a remarkable willingness
to accept successive military governments as being well entrenched within
days of seizing power, without so much as e% en a perfunctory enquiry as
63. Ihid at 571.
64 See eg. \,m Niughal, "Referendum and Deception", online: Paknews.com <http:'/paknews.
,;om/editorials.php?id=l&datel 2002-04-25 -: Gordon Barthos. "Pakistan votes, just as it's told"
loront, Star, (2 ,May 2(1102 online: Lyco' 1http:u/membre,,I co, fritthreatiarticle4.htm>.
65. Pakistan, Refirendum Order (Chief Exceutie',, Order No. 12 of 211)219 April 2002.
66. Chi I/us.ain Ahmed, .1mir Jamat A/Iam v (cnral Pert: -h,/oshrra/l P.L.D. 2002 S.C. 853
at X67 In gi' ing its sanction for the referendum. the Court ga\e a clean chit to the military regime
saying. among other thing', that "General Pcri eNusharraf, e\er since the assumption of power, has
been performing his functions and duties in accordance with the mandate gi\en to him by this Court in
Si ed Zufur Ah Shah's case and has been sin\ ing to translorm the Army rule into a democratic set up
as en\ ,aged in the atbrcad case "
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to the real support they enjoy among the population as a \\hole. Such is
the cavalier attitude adopted in this matter that, in one notorious case, the
Supreme Court of Nigeria put its imprimatur on a usurper regime even
as the regime \N as collapsing." Such a course of action w hich is hardly
calculated to inspire confidence in the capacity of courts to act as bulwarks
against subversion of established go\ ernments.
Control, rather than approval by a majority of the population, appears
to be the yardstick by which the claims of usurper regimes to have
successfully entrenched themselves are often judged by the courts. In
t illabhaji v. Controller of Tayes."" for instance, the Court of Appeal of the
Seychelles, speaking through Hogan P.. held that:
[W]hether the term chosen [for describing the status ofthe usurper regime]
is success or submission, consent or acceptance, efficacy or obedience,
there appears to be a consensus or at least a strong preponderance of
opinion that once the new regime is firml\ or irrevocably in control it
becomes a lawful or legitimate go\emment and entitled to the authority
that goes %% ith that status."
The court did, howevxer. sensibly suggest that "fair elections probably
provide the most convincing proof of acceptance of a regime."' This was
an unexceptionable suggestion but one which is not likely to commend
itself to many usurper regimes. It needs to be noted, incidentally, that the
Seychelles judges were dealing with a situation in which what they called
"the new revolutionary regime" had already been in existence for several
months and had "enjoyed unchallenged authority and maintained stable
and effective government in the Seychelles, with little or no interruption in
the ordinary life of its citizens."' unlike the Fijian courts which had to rule
on the legality of the military take-over within weeks-of the event.
Lapse of time almost inevitably w orks to the advantage of usurper
regimes. In Mokoiso v H. il. King .\lshoeshoe II,72 the High Court of
Lesotho had to adjudicate on the success or otherwise of a coup d' tat
which had taken place 3 years earlier. The judges took 'judicial notice' of,
among other things, the fact that the newv regime had passed a "formidable
body of legislation," that it had been functioning under a climate of peace
and stability, that the vast majority of people were acting in conformity
with the government's laws and policies, and that the judiciary had been
67. Federation v Guardian Newspapers Ltd., supra note 53.
68. Judgment dated II August 1981, cited in Republic ,, Fint r Prusad, supra note 7 at 406.
69. Ibid. at 407.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. [19891 L.R.C. (Const.) 24 [Mokotso l.
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functioning without let or hindrance. The judges noted, too, that the coup
had been popular, with news of it being greeted with jubilation in the
streets. Despite this finding, the court was at pains to emphasise that "no
presumption of regularity can operate in the regime's favour; indeed there
must be a presumption of irregularity."7' The burden of proof of legality
must, insisted the Court, lie on the usurper government. Even so, the
following observations of Cullinan C.J. show that there are clear limits to
the extent to which the courts can be relied upon to act on the principle of
strict scrutiny in this area:
Ifa revolutionary regime is unpopular or oppressiv e, it is likely that it will
meet N% ith initial resistance, perhaps even with physical resistance, and
the people will not conform ... Ultimately, however, the situation must
resolve itself, one wvay or the other. If the people ultimately acquiesce,
then the ne k regime is entitled to recognition by the courts.74
Cullinan C.J. formulated the test to be applied as follows:
A court may hold a re,.olutiona' government to be lawful ... where it
is satisfied that: (a) the government is firmly established, there being
no other go'ernment in opposition thereto; and (b) the government's
administration is effective, in that the majority of the people are behaving,
by and large, in conformity therewith."
Much the same realism was apparent in the judgment of the Privy
Council in the leading case of .fadzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke76 which
arose in the aftermath of the "unilateral declaration of independence" by
the Ian Smith government in Southern Rhodesia. "It is an historical fact,"
said Lord Reid, "that in many countries - and indeed in many countries
which are or have been under British sovereignty - there are now regimes
which are uni\ ersally recognised as lawful but which derive their origins
from revolutions or coup d'etats. The law must take account of that
fact."" The only qualification that their Lordships added was that, where
the ousted government had not thrown in the towel in the face of the coup,
the court had to exercise caution in granting recognition to the usurper:
73 Ibid. at 132.
74. Ibid at 132-133.
75. Ibid at 133 Intcrcstingly, the government which had been replaced by the revolutionary
gcmenment ,,ccking legitimacy in this case had itselfcormc into power through a coup dtat mounted
sormc 16 ,cars pre% im.,y. The court noted that. although that regime was notorious for abuses
of Ircedoms, it had to take judicial notice of the fact that the regime had remained in place for 16
years Een more interestingly, the go,cmment which %%as given recognition in Mokotso was itself
oerthrown in another coup within four years.
76. 11969] I A.C 645 (P.C.).
77. Ibid at 724
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If the legitimate Government had been driven out but was trying to
regain control it would be impossible to hold that the usurper who is in
control is the la% fful ruler, because that w'ould mean that by striving to
assert its lawful right the ousted legitimate Government was opposing
the lawful ruler."5
Most of the above noted cases have arisen in the context of challenges
to laws passed by the new regime. One principle which has now been
established beyond question is that. if the legality of the regime is
upheld, any laws passed by it (whether in the form of decrees or Acts of
Parliament) shall be deemed to be valid ab initio, not just from the time the
court determines the regime to have established itself firmly in control.7
Further, the legal order by reference to %% hich these laws shall be judged
would be the new legal order, not the old one, as was explained by Kelsen
using the following simple example:
Suppose that a group of individuals attempt to seize power by force, in
order to remove the legitimate go, ernment in a hitherto monarchic State,
and to introduce a republican form of government. If they succeed, if the
old order ceases, and the new order begins to be efficacious, because the
individuals whose behaviour the new order regulates actually behave, by
and large, in conformity A ith the new order, then this order is considered
as the \.alid order. It is no\\ according to this new order that the actual
behaviour of individuals is interpreted as legal or illegal. "°
The effect of these decisions is that the subsequent legality of an
usurper regime depends not so much on the motives that propelled it
into power," but the success of the usurpation. As Chief Justice Beadle
of the Rhodesian Supreme Court noted in Madzimbamuto v Lardner-
Burke, "[n]othing succeeds like success; and this is particularly true of
revolutions. "
The inequity of this approach is obvious. As well as rewarding
wrongdoing, it acts as an incentive for future adventurers. Justice Fieldsend
of the Rhodesian Supreme Court noted in his dissenting judgment in
Madzimbamuto that, "nothing can encourage instability more than for any
revolutionary movement to know that if it succeeds in snatching power
it will be entitled ipso facto to the complete support of the pre-existing
judiciary in their judicial capacity."' " As Haynes P. noted in Mitchell v.
78. Ibid.
79, See e.g. Vallabhaji r Controller of Taxes, supra note 68 at 407 (per Hogan P.).
80. Kelsen, supra note 51 at 118.
81. There may be occasions when, for example, a revolution is aimed at overthrowing a tyranny.
82. [1968] 2 South African Law Reports 284 at 425 (A.D.).
83. Ibid. at 71-72.
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Director of Public Pro. ,cutions,'4 a more stringent approach was called
for:
I do not think this Court can properly act on a bare statement of fact
or opinion of popular support, however credible and knowledgeable the
source is and whatever is the basis of it. Proof of the fact by judicial
notice may be admissible. But the weight to be given to it is another
matter. I would hold that what is needed here is proof of particular facts
or circumstances from which the court itself can infer popular support. 5
Before the approach of the Fijian judges to both the "necessity" and
"effectiveness" doctrines is examined, it would be useful to set out the
facts which gave rise to the legal challenges underlying the judgments
in question. To appreciate those facts, it will be necessary to describe
briefly the recent constitutional history of Fiji, which is rooted in the
politics of racial division and the contested legacy of failed power-sharing
arrangements.
I l. Factual background 0/the Fijian coup d'tat
The Fiji Islands, whose original inhabitants consisted of Melanesian and
Polynesian peoples, came under British rule in 1874 when a convention
of the High Chiefs ceded sovereignty over the islands to Queen Victoria.
Following the assumption of power by Britain, a large number of Indians
were brought into the country to w~ork as indentured labourers. There
%%as further aoluntary Indian migration in the twentieth century, which
led to Indians (or "Indo-Fijians" as they came to be called) forming a
substantial proportion of the population. " Given the cultural, religious
and linguistic separateness of the indigenous population and the Indian
settlers, it %%as not long before tensions began to develop between the two
groups. These tensions %N ere, hoxN eN er, contained by the colonial masters,
NN ho succeeded in maintaining at least an appearance of racial harmony
and societal peace.5 7
When the islands gained independence from Britain in 1970, they
inherited a Constitution which was at best an uneasy compromise between
X4 .iq'to note 45.
X thid at 73.
, At the end of 19X6, Indo- iiamns constituted 4- 7% of the population, %%hile indigenous Fijians
accounctd bor 4 1 I%, Nlth the rest compring people of European descent and others, see Nand
Kishor (hetty & Satendra Pra',ad. Fiji s Emigration An Eraminatton of Contemporary Trends and
I llC' w m l: Population Studies Programme, I193) at 7.
X7 See eg A. Ah, ilt "nom (olonty to Indepenknt,Ctn. 1,N7 4-9'?i (Su'a: University of the South
Pa.ilic, 19)77). K L. Gallion. The Fit Indian, Oh'lhngt, to European Dominance, 1920-1946
(Canberra: Au',tralian National Unicrity Press,. 1977); Bnj V. Lal, Broken Waves: .4 History of the
Fqi sland in i/it 200t ('eniirv (Honolulu: Unncr',it, of Hawaii Press, 1992); Deryck Scarr, Fiji: A
Short thviory (Laic: Brigham Young IIni\ crsity. I1)4t.
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the conflicting demands of the tx\\o groups. Unsatisfactory though the
compromise was, the leaders who assumed the reins of government at
independence somehow managed to impose a semblance of national unity
and governed Fiji as a fairly peaceful parliamentary democracy for the
following decade and a half. But the harmony was short lived: in 1987,
following the election of the country's first Indian majority government
(albeit one headed by an indigenous Fijian, Dr Timoci Bavadra), an
ambitious ethnic Fijian army officer, Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka, mounted
two coups N hich resulted in the abrogation of the 1970 Constitution,
the dissolution of Parliament, the ouster of the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet, and the declaration of Fiji as a republic."5 The Government
which followed, with Rabuka's support, soon promulgated a blatantly
racial Constitution ("the 1990 Constitution") under which a majority of
parliamentary seats, as well as the office of Prime Minister, were reserved
for indigenous Fijians.
Interestingly, the 1990 Constitution provided for a review of itself
within seven years. That rexiex\ took place in 1995 under the chairmanship
of Sir Paul Reeves, a former Governor-General of New Zealand. The
Reeves Commission recommended a multi-racial Constitution under
which power would be shared b\ the two main communities and the
system of representation would gradually become completely non-racial.'
The Commission's report was considered by a joint select committee
of Parliament which, after extensive deliberation, accepted some of its
recommendations (either as they stood or with modifications), rejected
others, and added a few of its own. The result was a Constitution, adopted
in 1997,91 which, while providing for "the right to equality before the
law," ' - nonetheless recognised "the paramountcy of [indigenous] Fijian
interests as a protective principle ... so as to ensure that the interests of
the [indigenous] Fijian community are not subordinated to the interests of
other communities. "" . Under this Constitution, 46 of the 71 MPs in the
lower house of Parliament were to be elected on a communal basis, with the
X . See e.g. Robert T. Robertson & Akosita Tamanisau, Fyi Shattered Coups (Sydney: Pluto Press,
1988).
89. For a brief anal),sis of the 1990 Constitution and its (in)compatibility %%ith international human
rights standards, see, Michael Reisman. "International human rights law bearing on indix idual and
group rights" in Brij V. Lal & Tomasi R. Vakatora, eds.. Fiji and the World (Suva: University of the
South Pacific, 1997) 181 at 224-225.
90. The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future: Report of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission
(Suva: Parliament of Fiji, 1996), Paper No. 34 of 1996.
91. The Fqi Constitution entered into force on 29 July 1998.
92. Ibid, s. 38.
93. Ibid., s. 6(j).
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remaining 25 seats being left open for non-racial franchise. 4 Furthermore,
the appointment of the national President and Vice-President was to be
exclusively a matter for the indigenous Fijian Great Council of Chiefs and
not subject to any process of popular approval. Indigenous Fijian interests
were also protected by a constitutional guarantee that no amendment could
be carried out, except in accordance with special procedures, to statutes
which safeguarded their rights to land and other entitlements.95
Despite the continuing racial basis of the new Constitution, and
its preferential treatment of indigenous Fijians, it was given a cautious
welcome by most political parties and by the population as a whole. The
first elections under its provisions were held in May 1999, and it resulted
in the emergence of a multi-racial grouping, the People's Coalition, as the
clear victor." This coalition was headed by the leader of the Fiji Labour
Party, Mahendra Chaudhary, who was duly sworn in as Fiji's first Indo-
Fijian Prime Minister, much to the dismay of many Fijian nationalist
politicians.
Within a year into the life of the neN government, on 19 May 2000,
a group of armed insurgents led by a failed businessman of mixed Fijian-
European descent, George Speight, stormed the Parliament building
and took Mr. Chaudhary and many of his ministers hostage, claiming
that the 1997 Constitution and the elections under it did not sufficiently
protect indigenous Fijian interests.'- In the immediate aftermath of the
attack, there was large-scale pillage and arson in Suva and intimidation
of villagers by mobs who began running amok in the absence of any real
attempt by the police to maintain law and order. Speight issued six decrees
between 19 May and 20 June, 2000, one of which purported to abolish the
1997 Constitution." This led to the declaration of a state of emergency
by the President of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara," who also appointed as
Acting Prime Minister one of the Ministers in the Chaudhary Government
94 Ibid, s. 51. This reseration of seats has, contrary to the recommendation of the Reeves
Commission, entrenched in the Constitution - it could only be re\ersed or modified with the approval
ofa majority of the electors in each of the respective communities.
95 Ibid, s 185.
96. The People's Coalition %%on 54 of the 71 seats in the lower House of Parliament.
97. This claim has been contested, not least by the Commander of the Fiji Military Forces,
Commodore Bamimarama, who is reported to have said that the coup had "nothing to do with Fijian
rights, nothing to do with indigenous rights. It had to do %th mahogany concessions and the losers
from the pre% ious election,,, people who would like to take advantage of a change in government
to get new positions, and hangers on who thought they could get a piece of the pie" (Commodore
liamimarama, quoted in Brij V. Lal, "Fiji's Constitutional Conundrum" [2003] The Round Table 671
at 677. This esplanation is not entirely far-fetched i regard is had to the fact that George Speight had
himself recently been ,iu,,ed from the headship of the state o'%ned Fiji Hardwood Corporation.
9K Fji ( on.Y1t1tutonn Revomaiwn I)ecreec 2001, Interim Millitary Government Decree No. 1 (29 May
2000).
99 Pro, 'lamution ofEmnergenc. ( 19 May 2100).
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who had not been caught up in the assault on Parliament. Parliament was
immediately prorogued for six months.
The stalemate with Speight continued unabated amidst rising tensions
until 29 May 2000 when the Commander of the Fiji Military Forces,
Commodore Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, assumed power and imposed
martial law, after the President had been warned by the Commissioner of
Police that his force could not guarantee the security of the nation. Styling
himself as the head of an Interim Military Government (IMG), Commodore
Bainimarama in turn issued a number of decrees which, inter alia, revoked
the 1997 Constitution"° and vested in himself executive authority over
the country,'' ostensibly because of 'the absence of any other viable
alternative."' 102 For good measure, the Commodore also issued a decree
which guaranteed most of the rights that had been guaranteed in the 1997
Constitution and which required these to be interpreted consistently with
norms of international law and "values that underlie a democratic society
based on freedom and equality."'
Some five weeks later, even as the negotiations with Speight
continued, Bainimarama decided to hand over the reins of power to an
all-indigenous Fijian Interim Civilian Government'o headed by Laisenia
Qarase, a former merchant banker. who was given authority to make laws,
by means of decrees, for the peace, order and good government of Fiji. 0
Qarase swiftly proclaimed his desire for a new Constitution under which
indigenous Fijian interests would be further protected, with the offices of
both President and Prime Minister being reserved for them.' 6 In the event,
that desire remained still-born after a constitutional review commission
appointed by him had to be unceremoniously wound up for lack of public
support.
100. Fiji Constitution Revocation Decree 2000. supra note 98.
101. Constitution Abrogation - Interim Mihtarv Government and Finance Decree 2000, Interim
Military Government Decree No. 3 (2000).
102. Affidavit filed by Commander Bainimarama in Civil Action 217/2000 in the High Court at
Lautoka.
103. Fundamental Rights andFreedoms Decree 2000. Interim Millitary Government Decree No. 7, s.
24. In a genuflection towards indigenous Fijian rights, however, this Decree subordinated the right to
equality to "any law providing for or protecting the enhancement of Fijian or Rotuman interests."
104. Interim Civilian Government (Establishment) Decree 2000, Interim Military Government Decree
No. 10 (4 July 2000).
105. Interim Civilian Government (Transfer of Executive Authority) Decree 2000, Interim Military
Government Decree No. 19 (4 July 2000). Under this Decree, any law made at the instance of the
Prime Minister would be promulgated as a decree by the interim President.
106. Blueprint for the Protection of Fijian and Rotuman Rights and Interests, and the Advancement
of their Development (document presented to the Great Council of Chiefs), referred to in George
Williams, "The Case that Stopped a Coup?: The Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in Fiji" (2001) 1
Oxford U. Cmwlth. L. J.] 73 at 78.
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The deposed Prime Minister, Chaudhary, was eventually released,
following a deal agreed between Speight and Bainimarama, but neither
the 1997 Constitution nor the Parliament elected under it were resurrected.
The Interim Civilian Government did, however. "re-establish" the Fijian
High Court and the Court of Appeal in August 2000, '07 although, in an
interesting departure from the traditional practice of coup leaders elsewhere
in the world, it did not require the incumbent judges to take a fresh oath
of allegiance.""
IV. The Prasad trial
Chandrika Prasad wvas an lndo-Fijian farmer who, in the aftermath of the
take-over of Parliament, had been forced off his land by a mob which, as
\Nell as vandalising his homestead, butchering his cattle and damaging his
crops, issued death threats against him. After failing to obtain assistance
from the police, he filed an action in the High Court at Lautoka by way of
originating summons against the Republic of Fiji and the Attorney-General
of the Interim Ci\ilian Government, "' seeking, inter alia, declarations
that:
(I) the attempted coup of 19 Ma\ 2000 by George Speight was
unsuccessful:(2) the declaration of a state of emergency by the President was
unconstitutional:
(3) the purported revocation of the 1997 Constitution by the Interim
Militar (io\ emment w as unconstitutional;(4) the 1997 Constitution still remained in force; and
(5) the (iovernment formed following the May 1999 elections was
still a lcoall\ constituted Government.
Prasad's action \N as heard by Mr. Justice Anthony Gates, sitting as a
single judge in the Lautoka High Court, in August 2000. After dealing
\'ith a number of interlocutory applications - including an application to
strike out the action on the grounds that Prasad had no locus standi and
107, Judicature Dcicrc 2filw, Interim Cis dian Government Decree No. 22 (18 August 2000). This
Decree also abolished the Supreme Court and made the Court of Appeal the final forum for the hearing
of appeals.
SI1s. A recent example of this phenomenon is provided bx Pakistan where General Pervez Musharraf,
who mounted a succes'ul coup in 1999. required all existing judges %%ho NNished to continue in
ollicc to take a fresh oath swearing allegiance to the ney, regime under the Oath of Office (Judges)
Order 2000, \ hen the Chiel Justice and 13 of his colleagues refused to comply, they were promptly
dismissed (a fte judges aNcre cased out hix not being invited to take the ness oath ): see Colin Nicholls,
"''kistan: The Military Go\ ernment and the Neu Constitutional Order" [2000] The Commonwealth
La% \er 10 at II.
109. Chandrika Proaad %: The Republic of lImi and .41ornev-General of Fiji (2000), Civil Action No.
-113( f0217,iiiL,
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that his claim was *'scandalous, frivolous or vexatious""10 - Mr. Justice
Gates delivered judgment on 15 November 2000. He held that the
attempted coup of 19 May .%as unsuccessful, but the declaration of the
state of emergency by the Governor \\as justified under the doctrine of
necessity. That doctrine did not, however, extend, in his opinion, to the
act of revocation of the 1997 Constitution which consequently continued
to be -the supreme and extant law of Fiji today." Justice Gates went on to
declare that the Parliament, whose members had been elected in 1999, was
still in being, and that the President, Ratu Sir Kamesese Mara (who had,
shortly after the imposition of martial law by Commodore Bainimarama,
stepped aside) still continued to hold that office."'
Somewhat less sure-footedly, the learned judge went on to rule that
the President should summon Parliament "at his discretion, but as soon
as practicable," and that "owing to the uncertainty over the Government,
it will remain for the President to appoint as soon as possible as Prime
Minister a member of the House of Representatives who, in the President's
opinion, can form a go\ emiment that has the confidence of the House of
Representatives .... "...- He "invited and recommended" the military "to
ensure a smooth and amicable handover of Government to that which
will soon be chosen by the incoming Prime Minister" and advised "all
participants in the political process ... to act unselfishly and wisely" and
to explore the possibility of forming a Government of National Unity,
based on the concept of a multi-party Cabinet provided for in the 1997
Constitution."'
V. The appellate proceedings
Although the Interim Civilian Government did not heed Justice Gates' call
to summon Parliament, it swiftly signalled its intention to engage in the
judicial process by lodging an appeal against his judgment in the Court of
Appeal and thus submitting to the jurisdiction of that court. ' " Whether or
not this act was motivated by a desire to show to the world that "[e]ven
after the coup, respect for the rule of law and the judiciary prevailed as
a fundamental principle of Fijian political culture,""' 5 as claimed by one
110. Summons to Strike Out, 7 August 2000, filed by the Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General's
Chambers, Government of Fiji.
11. Prasad v. Republic of Fiji, supra note 7 at 47-48.
112. Ibid. at 48.
113. Ibid. at 47.
114. Submissions on Behalf of the Respondent, Chandrika Prasad. Civil Appeal No. ABU 0078 of
2000 (Fiji C.A.), lodged on 17 November 2000. An application by the caretaker administration to
have the High Court's judgment stayed was dismissed by Justice Maurice Casey in the Fiji Court of
Appeal on 17 Jan. 2001.
115. Williams, supra note 106 at 83.
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commentator, is a moot point. Whatever the motives, the stage was set
for another round of legal jousting, this time conducted in the presence of
five judges drawn from neighbouring Australia, New Zealand, Papua New
Guinea and Tonga." 6
The hearings in the Court of Appeal lasted four days,'" and they
were televised by a local TV channel with the court's permission. Both
sides were represented by English QCs,"' who were allowed to lead new
evidence in view of the important issues raised in the appeal. " The central
issue before the court was "whether the Commander of the Fiji Military
Forces had, by his actions of 29 May 2000 and thereafter, created a new
legal order under which the 1997 Constitution had been abrogated." It
also addressed a number of subsidiary, albeit no less important, questions,
including the following:
(a) whether the court had jurisdiction to decide if a new regime, set up
in defiance of the 1997 Constitution, had become legal;
(b) whether the events of 21) May and thereafter had the effect of
dissoh ing Parliament;(c) whether, and if so w hen, President Ratu Sir Kamesese Mara had
resigned the office of President following the events of 29 May.
Although the Court disagreed with the High Court in some key respects,
it affirmed the High Court's finding on the central issue of the status of the
1997 Constitution. In doing so, it relied, as did the court below, on the
doctrine of necessity, but laid down clear limits on the use of that doctrine.
It examined the long line of Kelsen inspired jurisprudence emanating from
other parts of the Commonwealth, but cautioned against an over-reliance
on that jurisprudence, noting, among other things, that many of those
cases '\ere decided before the modem shift towards insistence on basic
human rights in a raft of international treaties.... "'' That jurisprudence
has, rightly, been criticised for being at best an unreliable antidote to the
malaise of constitutional overthrows and at worst an irresistible invitation
to future coup plotters.
As a preliminary observation, it is worth noting that the judges in
Prasad, at both trial and appellate levels, saw themselves as continuing
to sit as judges of the old, i.e. pre-coup, legal order and to treat that order
II . New /ca land contributed two judges, including the presiding judge (Justice Casey) and the other
three juristictions one each.
117. 19-22 February 200111.
1 1X Mr Nicholas Blake ' lor the appellant and Nir Geoffrey Robertson QC for the respondent.
119. The Court treated the proceedings as a re-hearing, and went on to decide the appeal on the
situation that preN ailed at the time o" the hearing rather than at the time of the original action in the
High Court.
120 Repuhlc of Fyi i Pru.N, iasura note 7 at 415.
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as still subsisting, albeit with some modifications brought about by the
exigencies of the situation. They were therefore able to assess the validity
of the acts of the usurper by the touchstone of that old order and to enter
findings of invalidity where Nvarranted. 121 Their position was made slightly
easier by the fact that, not only did they not have to swear allegiance to the
usurper (as judges are often required to do in post-coup situations), but the
usurper himself had submitted to their jurisdiction. These circumstances
may have emboldened them in their belief, and underpinned the approach
they adopted, that the changes effected by the usurper were purely
temporary. the judges based all their determinations on the premise that
the original constitutional order wvould eventually be restored, even if
some of the deviations from that order had to be condoned on the principle
of necessity.
VI. State .Vecessitr in Prasad
Some of the jurisprudence on the doctrine of necessity, discussed earlier,
was referred to in the Prasad judgments. The judges noted, pertinently,
that Prasad was unique in that "it is the only [case] where the purported
rulers of a country seek through the court process an endorsement that
they are in fact the legal (although not necessarily legitimate) government
of the country. "' --  Part of the reason for this opinion might have been
the substantial political and diplomatic pressure that was exerted by Fiji's
neighbours, notably Australia and New Zealand (as well as by the wider
international community), pressure that such a small country as Fiji could
ill-afford to ignore. Part of the reason may also have been that, unlike
previous coups, in Fiji and elsewhere, the 2000 usurpation of power did
not have the full backing of the military or the police force, both of which
were, according to expert observers. "'divided about supporting the illegal
seizure of power."' -3 It needs to be remembered, too, that the Prasad case
was brought quite soon after the effects of the coup had become known;
in most previous cases, the legal challenges came much later, which
enabled the usurper regimes to claim that the post-coup order had become
sufficiently acceptable to the people. -4
121. This was in contrast to the position in which the judges in Rhodesia found themselves following
the "unilateral declaration of independence" in that country in 1965, when they had to choose between
continuing to sit as judges appointed under the old (British) order or becoming judges under the new
(Rhodesian) order.
122. Republic ofFyi v. Prasad, supra note 7 at 402. Justice Gates in the court below has also referred
to the Prasad case as "[probably] the second most significant and important action ever brought before
a Fiji court," ibid. at 31. The first such was a challenge to the legality of certain actions which
followed the earlier coup of 1987, see Bavadra v At-Gen. [1987] S.P.L.R. 95.
123. Brij V. Lal, "Fiji's Constitutional Conundrum" [2003] The Round Table 671 at 677.
124. This point was commented upon, albeit in passing, by the Court of Appeal judges, see Republic
of Fiji i Prasad, supra note 7 at 402.
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To the credit of the Fijian judges, they adopted a more discerning and
democracy-friendly view of the doctrine of necessity in Prasad than had
judges in many of the previous cases. Both the High Court and the Court
of Appeal recognised that the rapid deterioration of law and order in the
country which followed the Speight assault on Parliament, coupled with
the fact that most of the members of the Chaudhary Cabinet had been
taken hostage, meant that decisive and immediate action had to be taken
to prevent large scale anarchy. Resort could not possibly have been had
to the emergency provisions in the 1997 Constitution, which required the
President to seek the ad% ice of the Cabinet before declaring a state of
emergency, since the Cabinet was, for all practical purposes, rendered
incapable of action. Even if the President had acted unilaterally (possibly
after consultation with the fe\\ Cabinet ministers who had not been taken
hostage), he would have had to rely on the military to enforce law and
order, gi\en that the police had made clear their inability to deal with the
looming anarchy. In the circumstances. the courts accepted, in conformity
with previous practice in similar situations, that the imposition of martial
law was justified on the grounds of necessity.'25
Necessity was, it is worth noting, recognised as a doctrine within
the pre-existing legal system. What distinguishes the Prasad approach
from many of the cases that went before it is the unequivocal manner in
which the judges delineated the boundaries of the necessity doctrine, and
the robustness \ ith which they condemned transgressions of it, all the
while making it clear that they saw the deviations from the existing (i.e.
pre-coup) order as purely temporar\. Gates J. could not have been more
definite in drawing the line:
It is ob\ious ... that the doctrine of necessity could come to aid
Commodore Bainimarama in resol\ ing the hostage crisis, imposing
curfews. maintaining road blocks and ensuring law and order on the
streets. Once the hostage crisis was resolved and all other law and order
matters contained, if not entirely eradicated, the Constitution, previously
temporarily on ice or suspended, would re-emerge as the supreme law
demanding his support and that of the military to uphold it against any
other usurpers. The doctrine could not be used to give sustenance to
a new extra-constitutional r'gie. Nor could it provide a valid basis
hw" abrogating the Constitution and 1rcllacing it with a Constitutional
Review Committee and an interim civilian goivernment, .Necessity does
not demand ant, of that. '-"
125 Ibid at 413.
12 'ravud v Republic (,/ lit, tur wo note 7 at 42 [emphasis added]. Those sentiments were echoed
hN the Court of Appeal which noted that "[tlhe doctrine of necessity does not authorise permanent
change,, to a A, rtten constitution, let alone its complete abrogation," see Republic of Fiji v Prasad,
ibid at 40i4
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Interestingly, the Court of Appeal disagreed vith the High Court in
one not insignificant respect. It saw no basis for Justice Gates' finding that
Commodore Bainimarama had "no ... genuine desire to remove the 1997
Constitution."'I2 Although this disagreement did not make any difference
to the outcome of the case, it is interesting because it shows a willingness
on the part of the appellate judges - in stark contrast to the traditional
reticence of courts in similar situations - to enquire into, and enter a finding
on, the intentions of the key pla% ers whose actions have been impugned
before it. It did so after entertaining further evidence on the conduct of the
parties, including affidavits from the Commodore himself, evidence which
was more extensive than had been available to the court below.
VII. Elkctiveness of the riegime change in PrNasad
The Prasad judgments are also noteworthy for their resoluteness in
taking a more questioning approach on the issue of the effectiveness
of the regime change brought about by the actions of Commodore
Bainimarama. Counsel for Mr. Prasad argued that it \ as unnecessary
to consider this question because. in their opinion, once the judges had
ruled that the purported abrogation of the 1997 Constitution was invalid
by the touchstone of the necessit\ doctrine, any further enquiry as to the
popular acceptance or otherwise of the new (unconstitutional) regime was
not only superfluous, but was likely to confer a modicum of credibility
on the regime which it clearlN did not deserve. But that argument did not
move the judges who proceeded on their inquiry anyway and made some
interesting observations.
The warning notes struck by Justices Fieldsend and Haynes noted
above' appear to ha\ e found a ready audience in the Fiji Court of Appeal
w here the judges who decided Prasad subjected the post-coup regime to
a tougher standard of proof on the effectiveness issue. The standard of
proof required must, said the Court. be of "a high civil standard," given
the "'importance and seriousness" of the regime's claim to be the new
government.'" Among other things. they required the regime to show that
any conformity and obedience to it stemmed from "popular acceptance
and support as distinct from tacit submission to coercion or fear of
force." 30 They held, too, that it \ as not enough for the regime to show
simply that the normal day to day running of the administration continued
unhampered during the coup period and in its immediate aftermath. Such
'normality' (e.g. the smooth working of government departments such as
127. Ibid. at 43.
128. See text at notes 83 and 85.
129. Republic of Fiji i Prasad, supra note 7 at 412.
130. Ibid. at 413.
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tax and land title offices) was, said the Court, not uncommon even in the
context of unconstitutional regime changes. More convincing, but by no
means conclusive, indicators of the acceptance by the population at large
of an usurper government were the government's affirmations of electoral
rights and personal freedoms.
The Court examined the claim of the Interim Civilian Government
(ICG) to be the true and firmly established government of Fiji under
tw o heads, viz.- (I) whether it had exclusive control over the inhabitants
and the territory of the country; and (2) whether the Fijian people were
behaving in conformity with its dictates in such circumstances that their
acquiescence could safely be inferred. On the first question, the Court
noted that the ICG, as well as and its predecessor, the Interim Military
Go ernment (IMG), had successfully quelled the violence and lawlessness
that had followed George Speight's assault on Parliament, and that it had
also put do\\ n an attempt by elements within the army to seize control of
the government some six months later. 3' There was, therefore, no evidence
of effective organised resistance to the ICG or any attempts to topple it by
force. That did not, however, prove the absence of a 'rival government',
continued the Court, because on the sworn testimony of the deposed
Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues, the People's Coalition was
ready and \ illing to resume office under the 1997 Constitution. The Court
noted, too, that at least two other legal actions had been mounted during
the pendency of the Prasad litigation, challenging the abrogation of that
Constitution."12 - This," ruled the Court, "is evidence that demonstrates
that there is a rival government seeking through the Courts to assert its
authority to govern."'"s3
On the second question concerning the acquiescance of the population,
the Court refused to accept the assertion of Commodore Bainimarama that
the ICG had effective control over, and the acceptance of, a majority of
Fiji's inhabitants. Such evidence as was adduced by the ICG in support
of this assertion came, said the Court, "almost exclusively from persons
holding official positions."" 4
By contrast, Prasad and his legal team had produced five volumes
of affidavits to prove that there was widespread public opposition to
13 1. Such an attempt was made on 2 No% ember 2000.
132. One of'them \%a brought by the A,,ststant Misnter of Fijian Affairs in the Chaudhary government
and two \lPs who belonged to the People's Coalition, both on their own behalf and on behalf of other
\Vnisicrs and MIN who could not (presumabl because they had been taken hostage by Speight)
put their names to the action. The secnd \\as brought by the Attorney-General in the Chaudhary
goemment,
133. Republic o /Fii v Proaad, supra note 7 at 414.
134 Ihid
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the ICG. These came from trade unions, religious bodies, educational
associations, human rights organisations, legal professionals (including
the Fiji Law Society), wvomen's groups, peace activists, and victims of
alleged discriminatory exercise by the ICG of police powers. "This
evidence suggests," said the Court, "that a significant proportion of the
people of Fiji believe that the 1997 Constitution embodies and protects the
ideals and aspirations of the different ethnic groups in Fiji. The material
also indicates a widespread belief that there was no proper justification
for its abrogation."' 35 Furthermore, the evidence pointed to a tendency
on the part of the ICG to "inhibit public expression of dissent," although,
significantly, the Court noted that "the press appears to be free to publish
views opposing the [ICG]."' 6
Somewhat more controversially, the Court referred to the visit to
Fiji of a delegation sponsored b. the Commonwealth Human Rights
Initiative (CHRI) between 27 August and 5 September, 2000, in the course
of which it met some 25 non-governmental human rights organisations
and community groups. The delegation's conclusion that "there is little
public support for the military backed interim administration"' 3 7 was, in
the opinion of the Court, further evidence of the ICG's unpopularity and
lack of legitimacy. The wisdom of this aspect of the Court's decision is
debatable, not least because it elevates to a position of near infallibility
the verdict of a body which, however well intentioned it may have been,
w as nevertheless no more than a pressure group, with its own agenda and
ideological baggage to boot. Besides. the verdict of the CHRI was based
on testimony which had not been subjected to the rigours of corroboration
or cross-examination in the wav in which testimony proffered in legal
proceedings normally is.
VIII. Human rights: considerations in Prasad
Another criticism that can be made of the Court's judgment is that it failed
to consider the importance of ensuring human rights compliance as a
relevant factor in applying the effectiveness test to the ICG. The need for
human rights to be respected, noted earlier, was emphasised by Haynes
P. in his judgment in Mitchell138 as a condition precedent to granting
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid. at 414-415.
137. See Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Crisis in Fyi: Democracy and Human Rights
Under Threat in the South Pacific, submission to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on
the Harare Declaration (2000), online: Human Rights Initiative <http://www.humanrightsinitiative.
org/the%2Dcommonm ealth/engage/cmagfiji.htm>.
138. Mitchell, supra note 17.
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recognition to a usurper regime. This point was canvassed at length by
counsel for Mr. Prasad who argued:
there are principles inherent in the common law which render it
inappropriate that it should take a deliberately neutral stance as between
oppressiN'e and non-oppressive regimes. Such principles would include
the law 's preference for individual liberty over the absence of rights,
its regard for openness for secrecy, and its preference of consistency
and equality to arbitrariness, unreasonableness and irrational
discrimination.
3 9
The Court's characterisation of Haynes' formulation as "'probably
[going] too far"' " is questionable, both on principle and having regard
to the particular facts of the case before it. Its belief that "[the 1997
Constitution] contains many of the rights and freedoms mandated by
international instruments"' 4 ' \as only partially correct. It needs to be
remembered that the Interim Military Government had, among other
things, diluted e\en the \weak human rights protection afforded by the
1997 Constitution by promulgating Decree No. 7, which made the right to
equality subject to "any law providing for or protecting the enhancement
of Fijian or Rotuman interests."'4 2
This change went beyond a mere derogation from the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Fijian domestic law. As counsel for Mr. Prasad
pointed out in their submissions to the Court,
[tlhe cxplicitl. racist nature of the political changes canvassed by
the caretaker regime contravenes customary international law. The
Appellants [i.e. the ICG] intend to safeguard the 'paramountcy' of
Fijian and Rotuman interests, and to ensure 'that the national leadership
positions ol Head of State and Head of Government' should never again
be held b\ someone who is not a Fijian or a Rotuman. (See the Blueprint
lor the Protection of Fliian and Rotuman Rights and Interests. and the
,Ad t'tcmnt o ftheir Development, presented by the purported Interim
Prime Minister, Mr. Laisenia Qarase, on 13 July 2000.) It is submitted
that the relati\e disenfranchisement and subordination of any racial
group, let alone one which comprises over 40% of Fiji's population,
amounts to degrading treatment contrar\ to recognised international
standards (c.f. East African Asians v. United Kingdom ( 1981) 3 EHRR
76 at paras. 207-08) and places the countr\ in clear breach of customary
13'. "Republic of iji v. Prasad. Outline ol'Submis.',ions on Behalf of the Respondent" in (2001) 2
Melbourne J Ini'l Law 151 at 1 X4 [the Rcvpondent s Brier].
141. Republic of Fifi v Prmoad. supra note 7 at 411.
141. Ibid. at412,
142, Fundmiviiial Right% and t')ccdfoms DeP, re 2(n((, supra note 1413, s. 24(6).
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international law.143
The Court's attention %Nas also specifically drawn to the strictures
passed against the Government of Fiji by the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination in 1996, when an attempt by the Government
to renege on its commitments under the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by means of certain far
reaching reservations under the document was rebuffed.'44 The Committee
held that such reserN ations were "incompatible with the goal and purpose
of the Convention."'4 -
Given that the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race
has not only been reiterated in all the leading international human rights
instruments 4" but has also, arguably, noN\ achieved the status of a rule of
customary international laNN, the unwillingness of the Fiji Court ofAppeal
to give it the consideration that it deserved is disappointing.'48 This is all
the more so if regard is had to the fact that there was no "'necessity", in the
sense of a compelling need, to introduce such a sweeping discriminatory
143. The Respondent's Brief, supra note 139 at I St,. para. 123. Also relevant in this context is U.N.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 25 on Art. 25 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 1996, 15110 \Ite, U \. Doc. CCPR C/21 Rc, I Add.7. which recognises
and protects the right ofevery citizen, inter aha, to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right
to vote and to be elected (12 JuIy 1996),
144. Ibid at 187, para. 125
145. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discnmination, Summao Record ofthe 1165thiftkctig,
49' Sess., 11651 \te., U.N Doc. C'ERD C SR.] 165 at para. 9.
146. These include: the International Convention on the Elimination oI all Forms /Discrimination,
(1966) 660 U N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969); the Iniernational ( 'venant on Civil and
Political Rights. (1966) 999 U N.T.S 171 (entered into force 23 \larch 1976), Arts. 2(), 20(2), 26;
the International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights, (1966) 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force 3 January 1976), Art. 2(2), the Convention Relating to the Status o/ Rtciiigcc. (1951) 189
UN.T.S. 150 (entered into force 22 April 1I'54i, Art. 3 Conv'nti, on the Rights of the Child, (1989)
577 U.N .. 43 (entered into force 2 September 1990). Art. 2(l); UNESCO, Declaration on Race and
Racial Prejudice, 20th Ses. U N. Doc, E CN.4'Sub.21-)X2'2/Add.1, annex V (1982); Convention
ILO Ao. 1/1) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, (1958) 362
U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into lorce 15 June l961o): United Nations Declaration on thc Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discriminaon, (1963) 3 I.L \.164: Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic tlinoritit'., (1992) 32 I.LM. 911; International
Convention on the Protection of Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 18
December 1990, U.N. Doc. A RES'45 158. Racial discrimination is also prohibited by a number of
regional human rights instruments.
147. See, e g. Judge Tanaka's Dissenting Opinion in South ll'e'tAfrican Cases (Second Phase) (1966]
I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 293.
148. It is noteworthy that s. 43 of the 1997 Fii Constitution expressly enjoins the courts not to deny
or limit any rights or freedoms that may be recognised or conferred by common law or customary law,
and to "promote values that underlie a democratic society based on freedom and equality," having
regard to "public international law applicable to the protection of rights set out in [the Bill of Rights
chapter of the Constitution]." The Fijian courts have also accepted the proposition laid down in the
Australian case of Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic ,4ffair v An Hin Teoh (1995) 128
A.L.R. 353 (H.C.A.) to the effect that the principles contained in an international instrument may be
used by the courts as a guide to developing the common law.
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law on any objective consideration of the matter. Such is the importance
accorded to the right not to be discriminated against on racial grounds
that governments are required to enact laws which prohibit both actions
with a discriminatory purpose ("direct discrimination") and actions with a
discriminatory effect ("indirect discrimination").4 '
Equally puzzling is the insufficiently explicit recognition by the Court
of the importance of the emerging international norm favouring democratic
participation and its relevance to the determination of the status of usurper
regimes such as the IMG ICG, The right to vote and to be elected to
public office, the right to freely determine political status and choose
governments, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,5'5 have begun evolxing in recent years into a stronger
"right to democratic governance."' 5' Even if such a right cannot be said
to haxe crystallised into a norm of customary international law yet, as the
Respondents in Prasad fairly conceded, the Court should at least have had
regard to 'a normative presumption or rule that individuals (like Chandrika
Prasad) or 'peoples' who have enjoyed democratic governance may not
have it removed by force.'"" As Prasad's counsel pertinently pointed out,
support for the emergence of such a rule was evident from, for example,
the unanimous \ote of the U.N. General Assembly for the restoration of
democracy in Haiti in 1991. Counsel's plea in this regard could not have
been more eloquent or more persuasive:
There are \ arious % ays by which the Court may take cognisance of this
development in international law, but it is bound to do so. The test for
"efficacN' expounded by Haynes P. in Mitchell is now bolstered and
extended by the emergence of the norm. It is contended that no military
junta or 'interim' go, emient that overthrows a democratic government
and lawful constitution should be regarded in law as 'efficacious'.
Protestations by 'caretakers' that they w ill introduce another democratic
constitution in the fullness of time cannot be taken at face value, and
should not be credited by this Court." 3
At the very least, the Court should have acknowledged the strong
persuasive value of the emerging right of democratic governance, especially
given its undoubted relevance to the subject-matter of the litigation before
149. Neccg. Michael Banton.International.1 ctionAgainst RacialDiscrimination (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, I 99h) at 66
15I Scc also the hiternational Covenant on Civd and Political Rights, supra note 145, Art. 24.
151 See retferences supra note 9; see also (iregor) H. Fox and Brad R. Roth eds., Democratic
Governance and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Unikersity Press, 2000) for a treatment
of this subject
152. The Rcpondent's Brief, supra note 139 at I X., para. 126.
153 I id at IXX para. 127.
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it. In a world of growing interdependence, this would have been entirely
-in harmony with the development of the international law of human
rights" and "appropriate to the times we are living in," to adopt the words
of Justice Michael Kirby of the Australian High Court.I 4
These reflections beg a more fundamental question, namely, has
international law progressed far enough to postulate that a regime which
is effective, in the sense of commanding the acceptance of the people it
governs, may nevertheless be illegitimate because, for example, it is not
democratic in character, or does not respect human rights sufficiently?
The Prasadjudgments do not provide an answer to this complex question.
Not only is the lawx on the subject far from clear, but it is doubtful whether
the question is even amenable to determination by a municipal court, yet
perhaps. Prasad has sowvn the seeds for further cultivation of the subject.
IX. The Prasadjudgments evaluated
The judgments in Prasad clearly represent a significant advance over the
traditional approach of Commonwealth courts to the issue of the legality
of post-coup regimes. By putting strict limits on the much abused doctrine
of necessity, and by requiring an usurper government seeking legal
recognition to demonstrate to a high standard of proof that, even if its
initial grab of power could be justified, it enjoys genuine and widespread
support among the people, the Court has shown that passivity in the face
of constitutional legerdemains is by no means the only option available
to judges. The judgments are certainly rich in symbolism: they represent,
as one commentator, who was also professionally involved in the case,
has noted, "the only time that a domestic court has pronounced that a
coup is illegal and that the abrogation of a nation's constitution is legally
ineffective."' 5
Symbolism apart, the judgments have had some practical, if modest,
beneficial effect too. At the very least they succeeding in putting brakes
on the illiberal IMG/ICG juggernaut which had been threatening to ride
roughshod over the remaining vestiges of democracy in Fiji, imperfect
though that democracy was in the first place. It is even possible to argue
that the judgments may yet "prove decisive in restoring democracy ...
in accordance with the 1997 Constitution,"' 56 but that outcome is by no
means guaranteed. But one important fact should not be forgotten, namely,
154. The Hon. Justice Michael Kirby, "Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights
Norms" (Speech delivered at a Conference on Implementing International Human Rights, Canberra, 6
December 1997), online: High Court of Australia <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speecheskirbyjfkirbyj_
inthrts.htm>.
155. George Williams, "Republic of Fiji . Prasad" (2001) 2 Melbourne J. Int'l L. 144 at 150.
156. Ibid. at 144.
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that part of the reason why even these modest gains have been made is
that the Qarase Government, unlike many other usurper regimes in the
past, agreed to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts and, even
more remarkably, undertook that "in the event of the 1997 Constitution
being upheld ... it would use its best endeavours to promote a return to
constitutional legality. "' " Not surprisingly, the Court made a pointed
reference to this in its judgment:
Where Courts ha e held coups invalid, the new regime has often
responded by a drastic curtailment of the power, independence and
jurisdiction of the Courts. The resignation of Judges on conscience
grounds in these situations opens the %N a, for the usurpers to pack the
Courts %Nith sympathetic Judges. To its credit, the Interim Civilian
Government in this case has adopted a very responsible stance... 5 '
In terms of their exposition of, and possible influence on, international
la\N norms on the unconstitutional overthrow of established governments,
the verdict is less clear cut. On the one hand, there is some truth to the
claim that the judgments have introduced a normative element to the
"effectiveness' test (though whether, for that reason alone, they can be
regarded as a 'legal landmark" 59 is a moot point); on the other hand, by
failing explicitly to incorporate an increasingly important condition within
that normative frame\% ork, \ iz. the need for usurper regimes to act in
conformity with internationally recognised human rights norms, the judges
have left the job incomplete. It has been argued that the international
precedent set by the judgments for assessing repressive military regimes
and their actions "will primarily assist the major powers [i.e. Australia, New
Zealand, Britain and the United States] to impose their requirements with
the assistance of the local elites, not one that wvill defend the democratic
rights of ordinary people."10 But that criticism is misplaced, because, even
if it is true that the outcome of the Prasad litigation accorded with the
worldview of the "major powers", the judgments clearly were directed at
defending the democratic rights of the ordinary people of Fiji, however
imperfectly.
One further reflection on these judgments is noteworthy: they were
rendered, at both the original and appellate levels, by judges who, though
157. Statement of \lur, Nicholas Blake (Counsel for the Appellants). Republic ofFiji i Prasad, supra
noic 7 at 412.
158 Iid at 411-412.
159. \\ ilham,,. mupra note 154 at 150
160. Michael Head, "A Victor. for Democracy? An Alternative Assessment of Republic of Fiji v.
Prasad'" (2((12) 2 Melbourne J, Int'l L. 535.
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sitting as members of Fijian courts, came from outside the jurisdiction.' '
This has been seen b\ one critic as "cmbody[ing] aspects of colonialism,
a relationship that mirrors Fiji's substantial economic dependence on
Western powers and international financial institutions such as the World
Bank."'O- But, equally, it can be argued that it is precisely because the
cases were heard by 'foreign'judges. who brought with them a high degree
of informed detachment and \\ere not privy to or influenced by local
politics, that they produced the results they did. As has been said about
the Privy Council in relation to appeals from New Zealand-a relationship
which has recently been severed,-a foreign court, albeit one which has
strong historical links with the territory in question, is often better able to
uphold the rights of the individual against arbitrary conduct by the local
government. ',3
X. The qftermath of Prasad
The Prasad judgments were followred by a succession of domestic legal
and political developments w\hich were aimed, respectively, at keeping
the government to the terms of the judgments and returning the country
to a state of normality. Of particular legal interest were two challenges
mounted by politicians belonging to the pre-coup ruling party. These
challenges resulted in the courts reinforcing the tough message put out
in Prasad about the need for the caretaker government to stay within
its narrow mandate. In the first case.' Justice Gates of the High Court
struck dowvn the establishment of a Constitution Review Commission
w hich had been mandated to take a fresh look at the basic law, obviously
w ith a vie\% to unravelling the delicate compromise reached in 1997 on
the issue of indigenous rights. In the second case, 6 ' Justice Gates held
unlawful a decree which had sought to amend a statute passed by the pre-
coup government granting exemption from value added tax on essential
food items.
The latter decision is particularly notewxorthy for the vigour with
which the High Court defended the line adopted in Prasad and reinforced
its message that the caretaker government was duty bound to act in strict
161. The single judge N ho heard the case in the High Court was of British origin, though permanently
based in Fiji. Two of the fi'e Court of Appeal judges, including the presiding judge, came from
New% Zealand, with one each of the remaining three coming from Australia, Papua New Guinea and
Tonga.
162. Michael Head, supra note 160 at 536.
163. Noel Cox, -'End ofthe Privy Council as the final Court of'Appeal for New Zealand?" (20012) 11:2
The Commonwealth Lawyer 32 at 33.
164. Jokapeci Koroi & Ors. v Asesela Rawvu & Ors., judgments dated 15 June 2001 and 24 August
2001 (Gates J.) [Constitution Revieit decision].
165. Jokapeci, supra note 7.
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conformity with the necessity principle laid down in those judgments. The
judgment also provided an opportunity for Justice Gates to amplify his
views expressed in Prasad. The caretaker administration was, he stressed,
nothing but an order restoring interregnum, during which the laws and
administration would continue as nearly in conformity with the old order
as was possible despite the changes that had been brought about by the
events of May 2000. "The [1997] Constitution," he said, "remains in place
until amended by Parliament, a body of elected members who collectively
represent all of the voters and inhabitants of Fiji. During a period of dire
emergency it may endure suspension, if such a suspension will ultimately
see the Constitution supported, and ensure its re-emergence."''
Gates J. also articulated his strong scepticism about the applicability
of Kelsenian doctrine of revolutionary legality to a situation such as
arose in Fiji. He outlined his views on the proper role of judges in such a
situation:
Unruly persons are unlikely to seek validation for their usurpations from
judges. Nor should the courts gi~e their sanction when application is
eventually made under the doctrine of effectiveness, for there is no moral
force behind it. In this regard, I respectfully differ from Kelsen. Judges
should expect and anticipate that the usurpers will see them removed. So
be it. Judges do not represent the law. The doctrine of effectiveness has
no moral underpinning, and judges do no honourable business therefore
in according lawfulness to the de facto administrations.1 67
He decried the tendency ofjudges in some of the other cases to accord
lawfulness to usurpers all too easily. "The usurper might rule, but that is
not a basis for according lawfulness ... 'Recognised as lawful' as opposed
to 'lawful' is quite a different concept with due respect to Lord Reid in
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, a decision made in what now appears a
very different climate from that existing today worldwide with regard to
Human Rights, good governance, and accountability...."6
Even more trenchant were his observations on the doctrine of necessity.
He used the opportunity provided by the present case to take a side-swipe
at a brother judge, Mr. Justice Scott, who had only a few days earlier
applied this doctrine rather expansively in another case 169 where a number
of declarations had been sought against the actions of the President of Fiji.
Those actions included: a refusal to summon Parliament at the request
166 Ibid at 30.
167. I d.a( 31.
168. Ihid at 32.
169. Aku ila Yabaki & Ors. v The Prcsident of Fiji & Ors. (I I July 2001), Civil Action No. HBC1 19
of 2001S (F. H.C.), unreported judgmcnt [Akuila Yabaki].
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of the deposed Prime Minister, Mr. Chaudhary, and his colleagues; the
dismissal of Mr. Chaudhary as Prime Minister; the appointment of Mr.
Laisenia Qarase as the new Prime Minister, and Ministers chosen by him;
and the dissolution of Parliament. Mr. Justice Scott held that all those
actions were of doubtful legality, but refused to issue all but one of the
declarations sought,"' partly on the grounds, that the "extreme conditions"
prevailing in Fiji had made them necessary, and partly because "it would
not be feasible to turn back the clock to May 2000... "', The learned
judge also cautioned against "excessive legalism" in such matters - an
observation which drew the following rebuke from Justice Gates:
When the ordinary man or woman in the street expects the rule for the
General Elections to be strictly complied with, as indeed is insisted on
in rugby, does anyone complain of excessive legalism? How much
more important is it then, that the Constitution be applied faithfully and
accurately, when and where it clearly can be applied without difficulty'?
With respect I cannot follow the application of the doctrine of necessity in
the Iabaki decision and I derive no assistance from it. There is a danger
in allowing the doctrine of necessity to degenerate into a doctrine of
convenience, a doctrine to avoid au kward or embarrassing situations. 7"2
Much the same concern for the need to be more discriminate in the
use of the doctrine of necessity is to be found in Justice Gates's ruling in
the Constitution Review Case."3  Holding that the proposal to set up a
Commission to initiate a far-reaching programme of constitutional reform
was "outside the ambit of a caretaker administration," he said:
Unusual programmes of expenditure or reformist projects are the
prerogative of an elected government. A lawful government needs to be
buttressed by holding the confidence of the House of Representatives,
and by acting within the Constitution with the two other bodies of
Parliament, namely, the Senate and the President. Moving in advance of
the will of Parliament in reformist fields, however well intentioned, is not
an act which the courts will validate under the necessity doctrine. The
authorisation for the expenditure of public funds for such reform work
is similarly outside the permitted scope of work of a caretaker Cabinet.
Such authorisation is unlawful. -
170. A declaration that the President's failure to summon Parliament was unlawful.
171. Akuda Yabaki, supra note 169 at 23-24.
172. Jokapeci. supra note 7 at 35.
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The cumulative effect of these judgments and one or two others 7,
has been to ensure that the strong lead provided by the Fijian judiciary in
Prasad was followed through as faithfully and as meaningfully as possible
by the other organs of government. In achieving this outcome, the judges
have, by all accounts, been fairly successful. At the very least, they have
managed to put down a marker which future political adventurers in Fiji
are unlikely to forget in a hurry. A further indication that the exertions of
the judiciary are bearing fruit, in terms of the return of respect for the rule
of lawx, is that those involved in the May 2000 coup are being brought to
justice without let or hindrance. On 5 August 2004, the Lower Court of Fiji
found a former Vice President and a former Deputy Speaker of Parliament
guilty of participating in the coup and sentenced them each to four years'
imprisonment. 76 As was said of the role of the Greek judiciary in that
country's transition to democracy. "'there can be little doubt about the
enormous symbolic as well as political significance of the courts' decisions
for the new democracy or for their profoundly legitimating impact."' 77
These judgments have clearly helped in the process of "constitutional
peacemaking" in Fiji.'
On the political side, however, the successes were more modest. For
all the pressures exerted by the courts, realpolitik seems to have asserted
itself interstitially, as is evidenced by the decision of the President to
dissolve Parliament in March 2001 and to order fresh elections. The
elections themselves took place under conditions of near normality, and
the% %Nere judged by most obserners, local and foreign, to be, on the
whole, free and fair. The party headed by the former caretaker Prime
Minister, Laisinia Qarase. won the largest number of seats (32 out of 71),
but the other parties, including the Labour Party, still headed by Mahendra
Chaudhary, made a good showing as well, together winning the remaining
39 seats. 79 Mr. Qarase was duly invited to form the government, but he
was sharply reminded by the courts that he could not rule on his own:
he had a constitutional duty to share power by appointments to cabinet
175 See e g.. Lasenia Qorave & Ors v Alahendra Pal Chaudharv, Judgment dated 18 July 2004 in
Ci\ il ,\ppeal No CBV 00(4 o1"2002S, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the Prime Minister \%as
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sharing in the Government,
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from all the other parties which held 10 per cent or more of seats in the
House of Representatives." This duty Prime Minister Qarase publicly
acknowledged shortl after the Supreme Court handed down its verdict.'
He subsequently offered 14 cabinet seats to the Labour Party while
retaining 16 seats for his own part-. but that offer wvas rejected after a long
bout of ill-tempered negotiations, w ith Mr. Chaudhary eventually deciding
to play the role of Leader of the Opposition in Parliament. Prasadwas thus
unable to put the clock back in the sense of reinstating the Labour Party
to powver, but it did succeed in draw ing Fiji back from the brink of chaos,
anarchy and a further bout of ethnic cleansing wvhich seemed inevitable in
the immediate aftermath of the Ma\ 2000 e\ents in Suva.
One other significant shortcoming of Prascl N\ as its failure, as noted
above, to accord the issue of human rights the necessary importance in
the judicial determination of the legality and/or propriety of a coup. This
failure was all the more unfortunate given the serious and widespread
violations of human rights that accompanied the events of May 2000.'
Conclusion: Prasad and ffiture usurpations ofpowei-
Whether the judgments in Prasad will have any significant impact on
the outcome of future coups d'&tat is a question which is as interesting
as it is difficult to answver. The rulings should, in purely precedential
terms, have a strong persuasive effect, particularly in the courts of other
Commonwealth countries. The authors of one recent study have expressed
the optimistic vie\\ that this "new jurisprudence" may replace, with
"canonical" authority. the "dodgy" jurisprudence spawned by cases such
as Dosso," ' though they do not underestimate the hold that the "dodgy"
jurisprudence continues to have on contemporary judges. "[Sluch is the
strength of the Dosso reasoning that traces of it exist exen in this emerging
jurisprudence," they wvrote, adding: "It is important that these traces
180. Each of those parties wvas entitled to nominate Ministers in direct proportion to their strength in
the House of Representatives.
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are identified and eradicated as courts develop and refine this emerging
jurisprudence."'8 5
It is possible that the Pra.'adjudgments may stiffen the sinews of some
Commonwealth judges and embolden them to shake off the servile
attitude that has often characterised judicial responses to coups in the
past. But that will depend as much on the individual strength of character
of the judges as on the inspirational effects of the jurisprudence flowing
from the South Pacific.
Prasad clearly represents a high water mark of judicial activism in
the area of unlawvful overthrow of governments established by law. For
all their shortcomings, the judges in Prasad probably went as far as they
realistically could in taking on the might of military strongmen and political
adventurers, bearing in mind that they enjoyed the power neither of the
purse nor of the sword. Prasad and related judgments clearly represent
a triumph for "defensive judicial activism": they underline the fact that,
for all the difficulties which judges face in the aftermath of coups d'itat,
it is still possible for the strong willed among them to salvage essential
constitutional Nalues consistently with the well understood limitations
of the judicial office. The Fijian judges have, it is submitted, managed
to achieve that objective on a principled basis and thus set an example
which is worthy of emulation in future Commonwealth coups. If the
political impact of the decisions has not been as revolutionary as some
w ould expect, it is because, when all is said and done, there are severe
institutional limitations to the role that the judiciary can play in "coup-
proofing" democracies.
Even so, the contribution that the Fijian judges have made to a "re-
legitimisation" of the law after its eclipse and threatened demise in the
face of o\ erw helming extra-legal force cannot be underestimated. The
developments in Fiji offer a salient input to the ongoing discourses on
transitional justice and underline the mediating effect that law, as enforced
by an independent judiciary, can ha\ e in paradigmatic transition.
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